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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
Rule 23 inherently imposes difficulties upon the courts. The time
and energy expended by the judicial process and the development of
imaginative and flexible procedures will not be easy. But if consumers
are to be afforded redress, if the poor class member is to be represented,
if wrongdoers are to be deterred and if rule 23 is to succeed, courts
cannot refuse their responsibilities.
Since the Supreme Court has granted certiorari in Eisen final
resolution is on the horizon. By refusing to rehear en banc 0 4 the
Second Circuit has deprived both the Supreme Court and the legal
community of the full benefit of its expertise. 0 5 It is possible that Eisen
will be returned by the Supreme Court for an en banc appraisal by
the Second Circuit. 06 Also it is possible that the Supreme Court will
find that the Second Circuit lacked jurisdiction in the first instance.10 7
It is hoped that the Supreme Court will squarely face and definitely
clarify some of the uncertainty that Eisen III has caused. Whether the
Court will accept the emasculation of rule 23 as a flexible and imagina-
tive judicial tool is a question of momentous importance to consumer,
environmental and antitrust advocates. Hopefully the Court will cast
a vote of confidence in the ingenuity of the federal courts and the via-
bility of rule 23.108
DENIAL OF REHEARING EN BANC
Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre
The Second Circuit in Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre' declined
to rehear en banc the decision rendered by a panel of the court. The
104 479 F.2d at 1020.
105 It was felt that rehearing would only generate "diverse views, necessitating ultimate
resolution by the Supreme Court." Id. at 1021 (Mansfield, J., concurring).
106 In Western Pac. R.R. Corp. v. Western Pac. R.R. Co., 345 U.S. 247 (1953), the Court
stated that en banc power is "a necessary and useful power-indeed too useful that we
should ever permit a court to ignore the possibilities of its use in cases where its use might
be appropriate." Id. at 260, quoted in Eisen Ii, 479 F.2d at 1025 (Oakes, J., dissenting from
denial of rehearing en banc). See Civil Aeronautics Bd. v. American Air Transp., 344 U.S.
4, 5 (1952).
107 In granting certiorari the Supreme Court requested the parties to prepare and
argue whether a district court's denial of class action status could be appealed under 28
U.S.C. § 1291 (1970). 42 U.S.L.W. 1053 (U.S. Oct. 16, 1973). An appeal is only permissible
from a final order. See note 15 supra, where Eisen I and the "death knell" doctrine are
treated.
Hopefully the Supreme Court on certiorari in Eisen will recognize the "death knell"
doctrine as a proper jurisdictional basis for the Second Circuit's decision, and will go on
to the merits of Eisen III, rather than leave rule 23 a hollow procedure. See generally
Note, Interlocutory Appeal from Order Striking Class Action Allegation, 70 COLUM. L.
Rav. 1292 (1970).
108 See note 80 supra.
1476 F.2d 806 (2d Cir.), rehearing denied, 476 F.2d 824, prob. jurls, noted, 42 U.S.L.W.
8226 (U.S. Oct. 11, 1973) (No. 73-191).
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panel had applied a modified equal protection test2 and held a village
ordinance providing that no more than two unrelated persons could
occupy a single family residence violative of the Constitution.3
The Federal Judicial Code provides that a majority of the circuit
judges in active service in a circuit may order an en banc rehearing of
a decision of a panel of the court of appeals.4 In Belle Terre, the court
of appeals was evenly divided on the question (4-4) and en banc rehear-
ing was denied.5
Judge Timbers, in a dissent from the denial of the rehearing,
argued that en banc reconsideration was necessary because a modified
equal protection standard should not have been applied by the Belle
Terre panel in light of the most recent Supreme Court decision on
equal protection.6 He further contended that recent panel decisions
were inconsistent and thus it was impossible for courts in the Second
Circuit to determine what equal protection standards should be ap-
plied.7 Thus, Judge Timbers believed that an en banc rehearing of
2 The Belle Terre panel formulated a test whereby even if a valid zoning objective
were established, the ordinance would violate the Constitution unless the means chosen
were in fact substantially related to that end. Id. at 814.
3 Id. at 818. The panel majority was composed of Judges Mansfield and Oakes. Judge
Timbers dissented.
428 U.S.C. § 46(c) (1970). An en bane court is composed of all the circuit judges in
regular active service. The courts of appeal normally sit in groups of not more than three
judges.
5 476 F.2d at 824. Chief Judge Friendly and Judges Hays, Mulligan and Timbers were
in favor of rehearing the case. Circuit Judges Kaufman, Feinberg, Mansfield and Oakes
were opposed to reconsideration. There is currently one vacancy on the court.
The 4-4 split prevented en bane reconsideration because although as many judges
favored rehearing the case as opposed it, the statute specifically requires that a majority
of the active judges agree to rehear the case. 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) (1970). See Zahn v. Inter-
national Paper Co., 469 F.2d 1033 (2d Cir.), rehearing denied, 469 F.2d 1040, 1041 (1972)
(opinion per Mansfield, J.), aff'd, 42 U.S.L.W. 4087 (U.S. Dec. 17, 1973). Judge Timbers
has expressed some dissatisfaction with this result. See 476 F.2d at 825 & n.l.
6 476 F.2d at 825, 826-27. Judge Timbers cited the case of San Antonio Independent
School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), wherein the Supreme Court applied the
traditional limited scrutiny equal protection standard and upheld Texas' program for
financing public education.
Under the traditional approach if a state of facts could reasonably be conceived tojustify the classification involved, those facts are presumed to have existed at the time
the classification was enacted. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Lindsley v.
Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911).
In cases involving a suspect classification or the infringement of a fundamental right,
the classification must pass a much stricter test. See, e.g., Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56
(1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S.
214 (1944).
Judge Timbers argued, based upon the Supreme Court's application of the traditional
test in Rodriguez, that the Belle Terre decision was an improper intrusion upon the
power of local government to regulate land use. He contended that an en banc court
should correct this error, rather than force the Village to obtain a "sure reversal" by the
Supreme Court. 476 F.2d at 827.
7476 F.2d at 825-26. Judge Timbers referred to the cases of Belle Terre, Aguayo v.
19739]
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Belle Terre would create an opportunity for the court to reconsider
the equal protection area and to clarify the Second Circuit's statements
on the applicable standards.8
In a reply to the dissent, Judge Mansfield stated, first, that the
panel decisions were neither inconsistent9 nor in conflict with the
Supreme Court; 10 second, an en banc statement of firm equal protec-
tion standards would not be productive because such standards must
necessarily be kept flexible and adaptable;" and third, presumed that
the en banc court would not be unanimous and thus the district courts
would rely on Supreme Court decisions for primary guidance in any
event.12
Although en banc proceedings do provide an important service, 3
Richardson, 473 F.2d 1090 (2d Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 41 U.S.L.W. 3602 (U.S. Apr. 8,
1973) (No. 72-1416), and City of New York v. Richardson, 473 F.2d 923 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied sub nom., Wyman v. Lindsay, 41 U.S.L.W. 3655 (U.S. June 18, 1973) (No. 72-1451).
In Aguayo, Chief Judge Friendly noted that, in his view, the Supreme Court was de-
veloping a standard more stringent than minimal scrutiny but not as exacting as strict
scrutiny. However, he concluded that whether the test be one of minimal scrutiny or
strict scrutiny, the challenged New York statute passed muster. 473 F.2d at 1109.
Judge Kaufman, in City of New York, also said that recent Supreme Court decisions
seemed to indicate that an expanded judicial inquiry would be permitted. However, he
noted that the state had not produced even a minimally rational explanation for the
statutory discrimination involved. 473 F.2d at 931.
Nonetheless, Judge Timbers believed that the equal protection standards applied in
the three cases were "highly inconsistent." He felt that the court had a present duty to
eliminate the uncertainty surrounding equal protection standards and not to wait for
further Supreme Court or Second Circuit decisions to do so. 476 F.2d at 826.
8 476 F.2d at 826.
9 476 F.2d at 828. Judge Mansfield contended that the various panels were only com-
menting upon an apparent trend toward a greater degree of flexibility in the equal pro-
tection area and that these observations were not in conflict with one another. Id.
10 Id. at 828-29. Judge Mansfield argued that the equal protection standards applied
in Belle Terre were in accord with the Supreme Court's formulation of those standards
delineated in San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
Secondly, he believed that the standards set out in Rodriguez would also require the
striking down of the Belle Terre ordinance. The judge also drew a distinction between
the essentially economic nature of the challenged state statute in Rodriguez and the per-
sonal right of association infringed by the Belle Terre ordinance. 476 F.2d at 828-29.
11476 F.2d at 828. Equal protection is a "proteus-like" concept whose standards must
be applied to a variety of situations involving significantly differing considerations. Thus,
Judge Mansfield believes that a certain degree of flexibility is inevitable and it would
serve little point to establish hard and fast rules.
12 Id.
13 The courts of appeal may use en banc meetings to resolve intracircuit conflict and
to correct error, thus reducing the burden of the Supreme Court to do so. See Eisen v.
Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir.), rehearing denied, 479 F.2d 1020, 1025 (Oakes,
J., dissenting), cert. granted, 42 U.S.L.W. 3226 (U.S. Oct. 11, 1973) (No. 73-203); Note, En
Banc Procedure in the Federal Courts of Appeals, I11 U. PA. L, REV. 220 (1962).
En banc consideration will result in the "law of the circuit" being determined by a
majority of the circuit judges rather than by two members of a panel. Zahn v. Interna-
tional Paper Co., 469 F.2d 1033 (2d Cir.), rehearing denied, 469 F.2d 1040, 1041 (1972)
(opinion per Mansfield, J.), aff'd, 42 U.S.L.W. 4087 (U.S. Dec. 17, 1973). See Second Circuit
Note, 47 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 345 (1972).
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their value is normally outweighed by the need to maintain the smooth
operation of the panel system. 14 Thus, in the federal system, en banc
rehearings are not favored and will only be ordered when necessary to
maintain the uniformity of decisions or when the case presents an issue
of exceptional importance.15
The modified equal protection standard employed by the court
in Belle Terre does not present a conflict sufficient to warrant an en
banc meeting aimed at restoring circuit uniformity. Neither the Su-
preme Court nor the Second Circuit has expressly condemned the
modified equal protection approach.' 6 Since the Supreme Court must
be the ultimate arbiter of the modified standard, an en banc meeting
could not produce the finalized restatement envisioned by Judge
Timbers.17
A finding that a case is or is not so exceptionally important as to
mandate an en banc review must necessarily be based on the value
judgments of the members of the court. Thus, the different circuits
have held a variety of issues to be important enough to consider en
banc.' 8 Belle Terre involved the power of local government to use
14 The panel system is the most efficient means for disposing of the heavy caseload of
the courts of appeals. Alexander, En Banc Hearings in the Federal Courts of Appeals:
Accommodating Institutional Responsibilities (Part 1), 40 N.Y.U.L. REv. 563, 576-77 (1965)[hereinafter cited as Alexander]. Judge Mansfield stated that in the Second Circuit an enbane rehearing can delay the final resolution of a case for up to six months. 476 F2d at
827 n.2. Even more important, an en bane meeting disrupts the normal deliberations of
the entire circuit.
The potential for disruption is enormous because the mere existence of the procedure
encourages attempts to use it in any plausible situation. Alexander, supra, at 599-600; see
Western Pac. R.R. Corp. v. Western Pac. R.R. Co., 345 U.S. 247, 270 (1953) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
15 FED. R. Apr. P. 35(a) (1973).
16 San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), framed the
issues in terms of the two-tiered approach. It did not comment on the acceptability of a
modified test.
17 En bane consideration could result in a definitive statement of the Second Circuit's
position on the acceptability of a modified standard. However, in view of the cost of an
en bane consideration, the court was justified in delaying such a meeting, at least until
the Supreme Court has had an opportunity to confront and resolve the issues. TheVillage of Belle Terre was not prejudiced by the denial of the rehearing because it had
no right to one, did not request it, and was free to appeal the panel decision to the
Supreme Court (which it has done). See note 1 supra.18 For example, the District of Columbia, Third and Ninth Circuits, have sat en bane
to hear cases involving subversive activities, while the Fourth and Fifth Circuits have
considered civil rights litigation en bane. For case citations and further examples seeAlexander, supra note 14, at 588-89.The Second Circuit recently has declined to grant en bane consideration in a number
of important matters. See, e.g., Zahn v. International Paper Co., 469 F.2d 1033 (2d Cir.),
rehearing denied, 469 F.2d 1040 (1972), aff'd, 94 S.Ct. 261 (1973) (jurisdictional amount for
unnamed plaintiffs in environmental class action); Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v.FPC, 453 F.2d 463 (2d Cir.), rehearing denied, 453 F.2d 494 (1971), cert. denied, 407 U.S.
926 (1972) (license issued by Federal Power Commission challenged on environmental
1973]
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zoning laws to eliminate "undesirable" patterns of residence, as well
as the implementation of a new equal protection standard. Since these
issues are matters of great legal, political and social concern, it would
seem that Belle Terre should have been reviewed en banc. However,
the Second Circuit has ruled that a case may be of such extraordinary
importance as to virtually assure Supreme Court consideration. In such
a case, en banc reconsideration would only serve to delay the ultimate
resolution of a vital issue and, therefore, should not be granted.19 Belle
Terre properly can be placed within this small category.20
The Supreme Court has ultimate responsibility for defining equal
protection standards. An en banc review of Belle Terre could only
result in further speculation about whether the Supreme Court would
or would not accept a modification of the two-tiered approach. In order
to obtain a definitive ruling on this issue, the Second Circuit properly
refused to obstruct the path to speedy Supreme Court review.
grounds); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir.), rehearing denied, 479 F.2d
1020 (1973), cert. granted, 42 U.S.L.W. 3226 (U.S. Oct. 16, 1973) (No. 73-203) (notice and
manageability of rule 23 class actions).
However, it did convene en banc to decide the Pentagon Papers case. United States
v. New York Times Co., 444 F.2d 544 (2d Cir.), (en bane), rev'd, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). It
also agreed to review a panel decision vacating an order requiring an international com-
puter company to produce certain allegedly privileged documents for the government's
inspection in an antitrust action. IBM Corp. v. United States, 471 F.2d 507 (2d Cir. 1972),
vacated, 480 F.2d 293 (en banc), petition for cert. filed, 42 U.S.L.W. 3033 (U.S. July 10, 1973)
(No. 72-1661); Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973) (en bane), was heard by
the Second Circuit sua sponte on the question of independent director liability under
rule lOb-5.
19 Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir.), rehearing denied, 479 F.2d
1020, 1021 (Oakes, J., dissenting), cert. granted, 42 U.S.L.W. 3226 (U.S. Oct. 16, 1973) (No. 73-
203). However, the decision not to grant en banc review of Belle Terre was vindicated by the
intention of the Supreme Court to consider the case. See note I supra. Interestingly enough,
Judge Oakes did not favor en bane review of Belle Terre. See note 5 supra.
20 Belle Terre provides an excellent example of the subjective nature of the "impor-
tance" ground. Judge Timbers felt that the equal protection issue presented a "substan-
tial question of unusual importance." 476 F.2d at 825. However, Judge Mansfield came
to the conclusion that Belle Terre was not "one of those truly extraordinary cases" that
should be reviewed en bane. 476 F.2d at 829.
Thus, there are three possible resolutions of the en banc issue, each one resting on a
subjective determination of what is "important": (I) the issue is unimportant and should
not be reviewed en bane, (2) the issue is important and should be reviewed by the full
court of appeals, or (3) the issue is too important to wait for an en bane review and
should be reviewed as soon as possible by the Supreme Court. The key to the en bane
issue thus lies in standards that are necessarily elusive. The result in any given case is
unpredictable.
It is also worth noting that the members of the Belle Terre panel each voted to
sustain his own panel position. The two members of the majority voted to deny review,
while the dissenting judge voted for rehearing. Theortically, the issues presented by the
merits of the case and the considerations attending the en bane device are to be indepen-
dently determined. There is, however, an irresistible temptation to defend prior decisions.
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